









CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
Discussion Paper No. 114 June 1986







The final version will be
of the 'Ralandia Case Studies' set.
available for classroom use September, 1986.
NOT FOR QUOTATION.
* * *
Copyright c 1986 the Regents of the University of Michigan
Communications regarding this work should be made to
Center for Research on Economic Development
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, U.S.A.
Discussion Paper No. 114, June 1986.
Published by the Center for Research on Economic Development,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, U.S.A.
PREFACE
The following case studies were designed to promote class discussion on
economic policy in developing countries. They are problem solving cases,
self-contained, and do not require any additional data.
There are three components: Ralandia (A), (B), and (C). Ralandia is a
fictitious country located on the southeastern coast of Africa. Ralandia
(A) gives an overview of the country, and is not in itself a case study.
Ralandia (A) together with Ralandia (B) make up the case on Agricultural
Policy; and Ralandia (A) together with Ralandia (C) make up the case on
Macroeconomic Policy.
In approaching the cases, the reader should keep in mind the following
questions: what are the problems that exist; what are the factors which
affect why certain policies succeed and others fail; what is the effect of
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Ralandia has excellent long-term prospects for economic development. A
varied climate plus a verdant coastal region give it the advantage of crops
as variable as maize, cotton and rice, as well as a range of fish and
seafood. In the interior, extensive savannah regions offer vast potential
for livestock production. Although the population is growing at an
increasing rate, Ralandia has one of the lowest population densities in
sub-saharan Africa. Long-term prospects, however, are threatened by the
severit-y of declining per capita agricultural production, and a balance of
payments crisis. Recent efforts at policy reform show promise of results,
but there do not seem to be easy options for the Ralandian government.
In 1975 a socialist revolution dramatically ended the economic
domination by British interests in their former colony and moved Ralandia
into the African socialist camp, with a domestic policy founded on meeting
the basic needs of its citizens and moving toward domestic equality. The
main street in Ralandia's capital is named Nyerere Street, after the
Tanzanian president who enormously influenced the new socialist rulers.
Production of rice, the main staple crop, has stagnated. Despite
various efforts, the government has yet to implement a system which can
efficiently generate a secure supply of reasonably-priced rice to
consumers. Revenues from Ralandia's traditional cash crops of cloves,
vanilla, sisal and coffee depend heavily on highly variable world market
prices. While in the late 1970s export revenues were sufficient to finance
basic imports needed to maintain growth and development, in the 1980s the
decline of world prices combined with decreased output of certain export
crops, has contributed to balance of payment problems. These difficulties
not withstanding, the country has managed to maintain credibility in the
eyes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank because a
gifted group of young technocrats has played a key role in macroeconomic
pol i cy-maki ng.
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However, in 1985, the Ralandian government is experiencing conflict
between the imperatives of socialist ideology and the realities of both the
international and the domestic economic situations. In addition, the claims
of socialist policy conflict with the outlook of international organizations
and financiers whose loans are not only vital for the recovery of the
Ralandian economy but for the longevity of the government itself. The
reforms urged by these organizations -- liberalization of producer prices,
disbanding of parastatals, elimination of subsidies -- envision nothing less
than the dismantling of much of the government's socialist program.
Country Background
Ralandia is a relatively large African country of slightly more than
one-half million square kilometers. Its nine-hundred mile Indian Ocean
coast line includes several substantial towns and two excellent ports, the
capital city of Masunebi in the north, and Tofaru in the south. Ralandia is
bounded on the north by the Victoria mountain range and on the west by the
vast Unumumba desert. See Map A-1.
Although its current population is just under ten million people,
population is growing at a rate of 2.75% per year, a rate that has
accelerated from 2.0% in the early 1960s (Exhibit A-l). About 80% of
Ralandia's population still lives in the rural areas, although the rate of
urbanization is almost twice that of population growth in general. As a
result of the socialist government's having given special attention to
education, today over half of Ralandia's population is literate.
The people of Ralandia share the same basic language and customs.
However, for the past century, Ralandian society has been heavily influenced
by outsiders as a result of colonialism and the rise of international
trade. In the twentieth century substantial communities of Europeans,
Asians and Arabs have settled in Ralandia. The country has two official
languages, Kiralanda, the indigenous language, and English, the language of
Ralandia' s colonizers.
Ralandia has an extremely varied ecology, including lowland river basin
agricultural lands, highland plateaus, forests and savannahs. Although in
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conditions that blow in across the Indian Ocean. Generally there are two
rainy seasons per year and sunshine for the rest of the time.
In addition to its rich agricultural lands, the country possesses
limited but not insignificant mineral resources, including mica, chromite,
and graphite. There are also small quantities of gold and precious and
semi-precious stones. Ralandia has little of its own petroleum resources
and is largely dependent upon imported oil. It has, however, developed a
significant capacity for hydroelectric power, but transporting the power to
the points of consumption is expensive.
Along with most other sub-Saharan African countries, Ralandia has
experienced very difficult economic problems in the 1980s. Per capita
income has declined from $350 per year in 1980 to only $250 today, making it
one of the African nations hardest hit by economic problems.
Political History
The pre-colonial kingdom of Ralandia was formed in the early parts of
the 19th century through the expansion of the coastal-based Molu clan to
establish territorial control of the coastal regions against the former
dominant power, the Omani Arabs. By the third decade of the 19th century,
the Molu oligarchy had established themselves in contol of almost all of the
habitable portions of what is now Ralandia. By the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, South-eastern Africa was the focal point of major
competition among the various European powers. The British, in a
coordinated move northward from South Africa succeeded in gaining hegemony
over Ralandia.
In 1897, discovering a plot by elements of the Molu aristocracy to join
forces with the Germans, the British abolished the monarchy and encouraged
European immigration from both Britain and South Africa to secure their
rule. Like Kenya, Ralandia was never able to draw enough European settlers
to make it a viable European-based colony. Nevertheless, colonial
authorities did act. to promote the interests of the settlers against the
indigenous population. A forced labor program, and the importation of large
numbers of Asian workers ensured the execution of public works and the
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prosperity of the European plantation sector, which was the core of the
colonial economy.
In World War II Ralandian soldiers witnessed the vulnerability of
British imperialism, when the British were defeated by the Japanese in Burma
and committed themselves to Indian independence. As a result, returning
soldiers and others formed the Ralandia African Union (RAU) in 1945. The
RAU demanded that the privileges of the non-African communites in Ralandia
be revoked and that the British take steps to bring independence to the
country.
After the war, British authorities tried to reassert full control over
the rural areas after their laxness during the war years. The RAU took
advantage of the ensuing rural discontent to mobilize the rural population.
In 1950, severe unrest swept through the countryside. The leaders of the
RAU were imprisoned in an effort to stem the revolt, but this only added
fuel to the flames. The British violently suppressed the revolt. In two
years nearly 100,000 Ralandians lost their lives; numerous old scores were
settled as British-armed Home Guards took on the bulk of the fighting.
In the aftermath of the revolt, the British initiated political reforms
that allowed loyalists to organize while precluding any resurgence of
anti-British associations. Michael Nkisane, a lawyer who had been in
England during the rebellion, formed the New Ralandia Movement (NRM) with
the backing of the colonial regime. The NRM was able to dominate in the
first colony-wide African election, held in 1959.
Nkisane led Ralandia to self-government in 1961 on a platform that
stressed the importance of the continuing foreign role in the Ralandian
economy as well as the necessity of retaining close ties with the British in
the post-colonial period. In February of 1963, Ralandia gained its
independence. Nkisane, in an effort to retain close ties with Britain, kept
Queen Elizabeth as the nominal head of state. Prime Minister Nkisane
created a political regime that had many parallels with others devised in
the early years of African independence, but was marked by a much weaker
commitment to Africanization. However, with Britain's dramatic loss of
influence in the post-colonial world, Nkisane's strategy of maintaining
close ties with Britain proved problematic.
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In the early years of independence Nkisane used his formidable political
skills to solidify his control and establish what appeared to be a viable
political system. By the early 1970s, however, Nkisane fell into weakening
health and his ministers were struggling with each other over who would
succeed him. At the same time, young officers in the military were chafing
at the growing corruption of senior military officials appointed by the
Prime Minister, unions were becoming increasingly vocal in their demands for
increasing job mobility for Africans, and former RAU activists were
successfully mobilizing opposition to Nkisane's neo-colonial policies.
"Vsipi manaharara" (where is independence?) became the watchword of
university radicals.
In the early 1970s, the Ralandian economy, which had grown at about 3%
per year in the 1960s, began to stagnate. In March of 1973, riots broke out
in the capital city of Masunebi over price gouging by Asian traders. A
military council of reform minded senior officers headed by General Sovingo
called upon Nkisane to step down. After a week-long crisis during which
Nkisane attempted to enlist the active involvment of the British to protect
his regime, Nkisane went into exile in Malawi.
The new government of General Sovingo immediately began to respond to
the populist political pressures that had led to Nkisane's overthrow.
Africanization of the civil service was sped up, certain sectors of the
economy were closed to non-Ralandians, and within six months British and
Asian firms were beginning to feel political pressure to appoint Africans to
senior positions.
On January 1, 1974, Sovingo declared Ralandia a republic, ending all
formal ties to the British crown. However, members of both the army and the
intelligentsia, attacked Sovingo for moving too slowly in ridding Ralandia
of all 'neo-colonial influences'. In August of 1974, Colonel Ben Kogotho
overthrew Sovingo. A week later, Kogotho was assassinated by unknown
assailants. A revolutionary military council took over. By the end of the
year, Captain Peter Kamande, a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist emerged as
the strongman in the military regime. Calling for a popular revolutionary
socialist regime, Kamande announced general elections to seek legitimacy for
his regime. He was elected President in 1975, re-elected in 1979 and again
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in 1983. Kamande created a leadership drawn from the various elements which
had been involved in the movement to overthrow Nkisane, including military
officers, trade unionists, ex-RAU leaders, intellectuals and technocrats.
In addition to the ruling party, several other political parties are active,
and a degree of criticism by the press is tolerated.
Governmental Structure
Between independence and 1974, Ralandia's administrative structure
paralleled that of other former British colonies in Africa. Beneath the
central government level were six provinces, districts, locations and
sub-locations, which were basically village-level units. Power within this
system flowed from the top down.
After the revolution, Ralandia attempted a less all-encompassing form of
Tanzania's Ujamaa villagization scheme, not including forced relocation.
This involved a proliferation of new administrative units, as the Ralandian
government sought more direct influence over the evolution of events in the
rural areas.
In the period since the revolution, the ministerial structure within the
central government has undergone several changes. In the early years, these
changes were a function of the regime's new commitment to socialism and to a
more active supervisory role in the economy. In recent years, they have
been a response to various efforts to resolve the economic crisis that
Ralandia has faced since 1980. (Exhibit A-2.)
Structure of the Economy
The economy of Ralandia is primarily agricultural. Since independence,
agriculture has made up between 30% and 40% of GDP, while contributing about
80% of the value of exports, and employing more than 80% of the population.
Industry, which caters mostly to the domestic market, is largely limited to
processing agricultural commodities and manufacturing import substitutes.
Mi ni ng of high-grade graphite, mica, chromi te and offshore petrol eum
contributes about 0.5% to GDP, although 4-5% of the total value of exports.
Exhibit A-3 shows the composition of GDP from 1964 - 1985.
The major food crops are rice and cassava, with small quantities of a
variety of other staples. The major exports are coffee, vanilla, pepper,
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sugar, cloves, cotton, and shrimp. Extensive grasslands are favorable to
livestock production. Although conditions are favorable for the fish and
forestry product sub-sectors, they are relatively underdeveloped.
Stabilization funds for cassava, vanilla, coffee, cotton and sugar, and
marketing boards for pepper, groundnut, cloves, and paddy have existed since
colonial times. Except for the rice marketing board, which has actively
intervened in the marketing process since 1965, the government's primary
role in these sectors have been aimed at stabilizing producer prices.
Compared with annual increases of close to 3% during the 1960s,
agricultural production increased an average of just over 1% in the 1970s
and early 1980s, against a backdrop of accelerating population growth. This
ocurred despite government efforts targeted at increasing agricultural
output. See Exhibit A-4.
Exports receive preferential treatment by the European Economic
Community (EEC), through the Lome Convention. Until 1972, several
agricultural export crops also enjoyed preferential treatment in specific
markets, including the British Commonwealth. Sugar receives preferential
treatment under the- sugar agreement concluded as part of the Lom6
Convention, and bananas under private agreements with British companies;
export quotas and prices for vanilla are determined by special agreement
with U.S. and European importers. When high quality rice was exported, in
the 1960s, it was sold to Commonwealth countries at pric'es slightly higher
than world market prices. Before 1973, goods could be exported freely by the
private sector, with the exception of coffee, vanilla, cloves, pepper,
sugar, rice, petroleum, and petroleum products, which required exit permits
issued by the appropriate stabilization fund. The structure of exports is
shown in Exhibit A-5.
After independence the development of the industrial sector was
encouraged by promoting foreign investment through measures such as fiscal
incentives, protection against competition from imports, provision of
institutional term financing, and special incentives to foreign investors
sometimes including monopoly status. Although significant diversification
of capacity took place in the mid-1970s, manufacturing was still dominated
by food processing, textiles, and apparel industries. Industrial output
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lagged in the mid-1970s. In the late 1970s, spurred by low interest rates,
available capital, and a list of interesting projects, the Kamande
government undertook a campaign of massive state industrial investment as
part of its "Race to 2000 Campaign". (Exhibit A-6.)
Like most African countries, Ralandia is highly dependent upon imports,
including a wide range of consumer goods and inputs into both the industrial
and agricultural sectors. In spite of particular emphasis on developing
import substituting industries in the late 1960s, the structure of imports
has remained remarkably constant between 1966 and the present, with the
specific exception of rice. In the early 1980s rice imports increased
significantly as a result of increased demand due to changing consumption
habits and population growth, and of production shortfalls due to bad
weather and declining productivity. In recent years, as a result of a
series of stabilization measures negotiated with the IMF and of government
efforts to reduce budget deficits, imports have been drastically reduced.
Imports which compete directly with domestically produced industrial goods
are prohibited unless domestic production is insufficient to meet local
demand (e.g. matches and batteries). Import licenses are required for all
imported goods. Exhibit A-7 shows the evolution of imports.
Before the revolution, the government followed a conservative policy of
restraining the money supply. Between 1975 and 1980 the government expanded
the money supply in conjunction with increased government spending, while
maintaining a fixed exchange rate. Since 1981, the currency, the rala, has
been fixed against a basket of international currencies. Exchange rates
over the past 25 years are shown in Exhibit A-8, along with the rates of
inflation and interest. Like most African countries, Ralandia had a passive
exchange rate policy until the 1980s when, as a part of IMF stabilization
measures, it undertook a series of devaluations, in an effort to improve the
competitiveness of its exports and meet IMF stabilization targets:
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DEVALUATIONS OF THE RALA
(1982-1984)
May January July October March June
1982 1983 1983 1983 1984 1984
13% 5.7% 2% 9.5% 13% 3.9%
The government derives current revenue mainly from taxes, with revenue
from indirect taxes more than three times that from direct taxes in most
years. Direct taxes accruing to the central government include a general
income tax, a tax on profits, a tax on capital, and business fees
(licenses). A tax on vehicles is earmarked for urban and rural
municipalities. Real estate taxes are levied for the provinces and urban
municipalities. (Before 1975, receipts from the head tax and the tax on
livestock accrued essentially to the provinces.) Indirect taxes include
taxes on international trade, excise duties on consumption, including
imports, a license tax on the sale of alcoholic beverages, and a turnover
tax (which became a value-added tax in 1969). Export taxes, import duties,
and revenues from the stabilization funds, together comprise the largest
single source of tax revenue. Exhibit A-9 shows the structure of the
central government's current revenues and expenditures.
Ralandia's macroeconomy has changed substantially since 1973 as a result
of increased food subsidies and government investment in social services,
industry, and agricultural infrastructure. Beginning in 1975 investment in
decentralized social services led to massive capital expenditures. to build
schools (elementary, secondary, and universities) and primary care clinics
throughout the country. In addition, to staff these facilities, the
government incurred huge annual recurrent costs for salaries as well as
purchasing equipment and doing routine maintenance. In the late 1970s the
government undertook a long list of projects including irrigation schemes,
factories for fertilizer, cement, and textiles, an oilseeds processing
plant, fruit canning factories, and refrigerated slaughterhouses. To obtain
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the massive amount of foreign exchange required by these projects the
government borrowed heavily from European commercial banks, which resulted
in a substantial increase in the external debt.
Role of the Donors
Ever since independence, external donors have played a significant role
in the Ralandian economy. In the period of Prime Minister Nkisane's rule,
the British played the predominant role among the donors. Ralandia
negotiated a series of agreements with the British which, in return for a
strong British influence, provided large amounts of foreign assistance,
technical support and military assistance. During this period, other
significant donors were West Germany, the United States, the World Bank and
the Republic of South Africa.
Ralandia's relations with the donor nations shifted dramatically in the
period following the rise to power of President Kamande. While seeking to
retain donor assistance from Western countries and agencies, Kamande also
sought to balance these with growing support from the Eastern bloc. The
Soviet Union became a major arms supplier to Ralandia and gave substantial
amounts of non-military assistance, especially before 1983. The East
Germans, North Koreans, and Chinese also played a significant role in
Ralandia in the period following the revolution.
The third phase of Ralandia's relations with donors began in 1980 when
Ralandia negotiated the first of what was to become a series of four
Stand-By Agreements with the International Monetary Fund. In the 1980s,
Ralandia has again become closely tied into the Western donors, though now
the relations with multilateral agencies are more important than those with
any single bi-lateral donor. In the past few years, however, the British
have reestablished a large-scale assistance program and the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) has established a country
office.
IIMF Stand-By Agreements provide short-term balance of payments
financial support to member countries, in return for government commitments
to meet agreed-upon stabilization targets.
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Policy Background
British policy in Ralandia was based upon the development of an
export-oriented modern agricultural sector while assuring that basic
societal stability was maintained in the subsistence sector. Colonial
Ralandia's modern sector was dominated by large plantations, owned by
British settlers, which grew coffee, bananas, vanilla, sisal, raphia, and
other exports. By the final period of colonial rule, African small-holder
producers were also beginning to participate in the modern sector. Colonial
taxation policies had been designed to provide workers for the European
plantations. The colonial government also attempted to promote the
cultivation of rice, the major staple of the Ralandian population, and
attempted to maintain a low price on rice in order to promote political and
social stability.
After independence, very little changed in terms of the basic economic
development strategies and policies followed by the Nkisane regime.
Increasing exports, predominantly by promoting the further productivity of
the European plantations, was the main aim of government policy. The
government also remained concerned with producing rice to feed the rapidly
expanding population. Import substitution efforts by the Nkisane government
were undertaken by British-owned firms operating in a highly protected
environment. Public sector investment focussed on export-oriented
infrastructural improvements such as roads, ports, and communication lines.
The Nkisane government did not initiate fundamental structural changes in
the Ralandian economy.
The period since the fall of Prime Minister Nkisane has seen a large
number of policy innovations. Some of these responded to the new socialist
character of the government coalition, some responded to changes in the
international economy, and some responded to the perception of weaknesses in
past policies. Immediately after the ouster of Nkisane, General Sovingo
sought a gradual transition to a more Africanized economic policy, including
increased taxes on European plantations, wage increases, limits on
repatriation of profits, etc.
Under President Kamande, major poli cy changes ensued. In 1975, the
government nationalized the vacant European plantations, began a campaign to
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promote cooperatives among African small-holders, and favored Ralandian
private trading companies over the larger, more well established firms (run
by Indian and Chinese residents), by giving them contracts to collect and
distribute goods for the parastatals, and by offering fiscal incentives.
Banks and major industries were all nationalized at this time.
In 1977, President Kamande declared the "Race to 2000 Campaign" which
envisioned achieving a semi-industrialized socialist state by the year
2000. In an effort to promote rapid transformation of Ralandian productive
capacity, the government took advantage of the dramatic increase in
international liquidity generated by recycled petro-dollars by borrowing
heavily from European commercial banks.
In 1980, the international recession struck the global economy.
Ralandia, having undertaken massive commercial borrowing at variable rates,
was faced with a huge balance of payments crisis. The government moved to
bring a number of highly trained technocrats into central policy positions
and at the same time approached the IMF for balance of payments support.
This led to a period of severe retrenchment, cutting back on the government
investment program, a series of devaluations, a lowering of government
spending and lessening of the budget deficit, and curtailing hiring in the
civil service.
By 1982 and 1983, the Ralandian government concluded that restoring
economic health would not be possible by economic stabilization measures
alone. In mid-1983, the government undertook, with technical assistance
from the World Bank, a major liberalization effort in the rice sector and at
the same time initiated a series of policy reforms in agriculture and export
sectors. In 1984 and 1985, Ralandia participated in another Stand-By






TOTAL POPULATION URBAN POPULATION
Population Annual Growth Rate Population Annual Growth Rate
Year ('000) (T) ('000) (.)
1960 5481 2.0 610 5.0
1965 6070 2.2 780 5.5





1975 7569 2.5 1240 4.0
1976 7760 1290
1977 7955 1341
1978 8164 2.8 1400 5.0
1979 8480 2.76 1470 5.0
1980 8714 2.75 1544 5.0
1981 8953 2.75 1621 5.0
1982 9199 2.75 1702 5.0
1983 8452 2.75 1787 5.0
1984 9712 2.75 1876 5.0







































































Undersecretaries for each Division
1Ministers, their Deputies, and the Parlamentary Secretaries are appointed
from the Parliament by the President. The Permanent Secretary, and
Undersecretaries are civil service positions. Beginning in 1978 the President had
the right to appoint 20% of the Parliament.
EXHIBIT A-3
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY ORIGIN (CONSTANT 1970 PRICES)
(billions of ralas)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Agriculture 64.5 63.3 65.4 65.2 73.8 72.2 73.7 74.5 81.3 80.9 73.9 76.3 71.3 76.4 78.3 77.1 77.8 77.9 84.3
Manufacturing (includes mining.
construction, electricity, gas 20.3 21.9 24.4 25.7 27.9 46.0 48.7 49.2 48.2 51.4 51.4 46.7 48.1 50.1 56.5 55.0 41.9 36.4 36.9 35.7
& water)
Public Administration & Defense 39.4 40.3 43.2 48.1 33.7 37.6 38.2 36.3 32.6 32.2 35.3 35.5 37.3 40.0 41.7 42.0 44.2 44.7 45.4
Other Branches (includes
transport & communications, 72.9 74.8 73.2 71.7 71.3 95.9 100.7 94.8 90.2 88.9 92.9 93.6 95.5 90.0 100.2 100.3 89.0 88.5 87.7 88.8
trade & finance)
Gross Domestic Product
(0 constant prices) 197.1 200.2 206.2 210.7 49.4 259.2 255.9 249.2 254.2 257.4 249.5 255.4 248.7 273.1 75.3 250.0 247 249 254
GDP Deflator
(1970. 100) 83.7 86.9 90.2 93.5 96.8 100 103.7 106.8 119.5 146.9 153.6 169.0 183.4 195.9 218.1 50.8 13.8 410.9 490.5 585.3
Gross Domestic Product
(8 market prices) 165 174 186 197 49 269 275 284 348 381 388 416 487 595 P90 789 996 221 374
LEGEND: Blanks indicate information not available.
EXHIBIT A-4
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
(thousands of metric tons)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Food Crons
Rice (paddy) 1320 1240 1360 1470 1550 1600 1946 1893 1924 1913 2013 1972 2043 2154 1918 2045 2109 2012 1970 2147 2130
Cassava 750 760 780 780 800 825 1218 1213 1213 1175 1264 1309 1390 1412 1594 1569 1683 1670 1698 1992 2047
Potatoes (white & sweet) 360 370 380 380 385 390 444 453 446 363 383 401 606 536 506 548 539 559 557 716 726
Bananas 15 15 17 17 16 16 271 264 246 300 325 437 351 261 233 250 270 260 284 286 224
Fruits 86 85 86 87 87 92 105 127 182 210 197 205 141 153 174 159 170 166 184 186 190
Vegetables 77 81 74 71 78 81 34 42 43 44 46 51 61 68 23 28 31 
32 31 33 38
Beans (dry) 23 25 26 26 26 26 35 34 35 36 34 37 41 35
Lim Beans 22 20 28 18 24 24 19 15
Maize 85 85 90 86 90 90 109 114 106 108 118 120 136 122 115 116 127 121 113 132 141
Sorghum 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2.3 3.2 0.6 1.8 2.3 0.2 - 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Groundnuts 31 35 26 39 41 46 41 41 49 38 40 42 54 47 34 40 39 33 30 32 32
Sugarcane 1250 1200 1210 1220 1250 1250 1239 1190 849 1041 1317 1377 1267 1281 1375 1444 1395 1420 1409 1616 
1660
Coffee 67 41 53 71 58 65 67 58 69 74 81 84 79 68 75 82 80 4 61 61 61
Sisal 29.4 29.8 24.4 22.1 22 25 26.3 24.7 29.5 30.9 30 21 25.4 26.3 16 18 16 15.4 15.1 12.5 12.3
Raffia 7.5 7.5 7.6 8.0 7.0 7.0 8.8 5.8 10.6 10.6 9.4 12.4 7.3 7.7 2 7 8 8 8
Tobacco 4.5 5.0 3.7 4.8 4.6 5.0 5 5.9 5 6 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 3
Cotton 4.9 5.8 5.4 9.1 11.5 14.0 19 22 25 31 33 30 35 37 33 30 23 28 26 26 33
Cloves 4.8 6.0 0.3 13.0 0.5 2.5 3.4 6 6 4 18 5 13 14 13 4 12 10.8 9.9 4.2 18.0
Pepper 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.1 3.5 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.0 4.9 2.9 3- 3 3 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6
Vanilla 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 1. 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.0 3 2 3 4.3 5.5 2.2 6.9
Cocoa 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.2 1 2 2 1.8 1.9 2.8 3.0
LEGEND: - indicates the value is negligible or zero.




(value in millions of ralas)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Main Agricultural Products 17091 18118 21307 19349 10900 26240 25894 32360 41239 43841 61258 67585 61707 60618 65194 92434 93912 142561
Coffee 7593 8122 8803 8270 1500 11645 13300 15600 14073 28326 40456 36583 38074 45110 30353 32610 49400 81725
Sugar 1485 2138 1575 1656
Sisal 972 721 749 904 921 1522 2546 2134 1242 1497 1209 1774 1711 1813 2240 1746 2573
Rice 1052 1854 3047 2438 1651 560 1071 565 499 377 171 157 218 266 27 -- --
Vanilla 2216 1672 2530 3013 3600 3918 2217 4476 2966 4733 8752 8645 3114 3945 7491 19778 27212 30400
Groundnuts 295 364 301 247 329 290 165 -- -- 65
Cloves 579 876 1952 407 4700 4207 4058 4008 17345 4304 4923 17223 14979 6583 17721 27400 11022 20485
Livestock & Fishing Products 2587 2211 2186 2903 7198 7938 8853 5028 5346 7045 5865 8057 7928 5916 8125 12860 18157
Agricultural Manufactured Goods 3291 4176 5168 5821 4692 3771 3372 4295 1910 2476 7151 7559
Textiles & Shoes 202 588 1576 1319 2069 1662 2165 1425 4064 2611 6225 6683
Hood & Paper Products 153 123 168 222 177 309 483 186 237 269 181 163 -- -- 133 175
Mineral Products 812 692 736 1105 1893 1725 2914 2656 3812 4765 3513 3915 4391 3922 4270 6683
Petroleum Products 166 982 952 1043 1600 1671 2281 5644 5546 4323 2345 1365 2235 1373 4072 3791 4122 811
Total Exports 24132 25711 28608 29154 40222 40807 41864 44751 58504 63044 66035 82927 87214 83800 84800 83500 107900 128673 182629
Total Exports in Constant
1975 ralas 54035 53732 60596 57843 63009 53764 63048 63030 63043 63044 63071 63062 78713 78982 78157 77530 94649 115817 146220
Value Index (1975 - 100) 44.7 47.9 47.2 50.4 63.8 64.7 66.4 71.0 92.8 100 104.7 131.5 110.8 106.1 108.5 107.7 114.0 111.1 124.9
LEGEND: - indicates the value is negligible or zero.
A blank indicates the information is not available.
EXHIBIT A-6
INDUSTRIAL PREDUCTION
('000 metric tons, unless specified)
1965196619671968____ ~19 9 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 11975 1976 1977 1978 11979 11980 J1981 1982I93l8
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LEGEND: - indicates the value is negligible or zero.
A blank indicates the information is not available.
EXHIBIT A-7
VALUE OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
(millions of ralas)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Food & Beverages 4778 3760 4373 5795 5400 7300 5827 7245 12638 8429 6966 9865 14393 17192 8137 26636 44030 29948 21620
Rice 1223 2869 9259 4893 4360 4325 8930 10989 3088 18451 36717 24375 17177
Cereals & Cereal
Products 1148 1059 881 968 1045 2866 2994 2869 2317 6316 3715 799 1161
Dairy Products 1417 919 1041 988 835 1256 1205 1747 1503 745 1569 1782 2267
Processed Food 868 1030 708 801 369 752 529 825 549 414 202 1821 477
Beverages 959 1159 518 553 211 506 458 440 451 373 62 90 435
Other 213 209 230 225 146 160 277 322 229 337 1765 81 103
Other Consumer Goods 6638 7959 10761 9593 8800 11100 9712 8725 9401 11844 11766 15840 12796 17946 17868 11687 13150 13745 20178
Tobacco & Tobacco
Productso490 256 201 363 258 256 922 1102 561 435 39 430 171
Soap & Cosmetics 260 251 145 188 151 176 124 89 91 159 496 63 249
Pharmaceuticals 966 976 1266 1160 1623 1636 2398 2467 3235 3665 4065 4698 4750 4107 3286 3897 4685
Books & Periodicals 358 306 456 603 359 528 945 1062 1188 1216 1800 1290 1543
Textiles 4620 5423 6684 5036 1287 1004 945 978 886 1070 850 1471 1095 678 560 660 2055
Rubber Products 1028 893 1072 2529 2282 1567 1389 2993 3546 2136 1807 2763 3997
Cutlery & Household 202 132 236 202 441 755 456 1066 1026 272 342 543 764
Electrical Equipment 1192 1539 1825 1880 577 - 876 1419 1519 890 765 982 2466
Cars, Motorcycles, etc. 1052 1160 1441 1394 363 349 331 596 576 - 640 1130 1492 360 460 282 758
Other 2910 2360 1793 4260 3000 - 2529 2916 2600 1433 3595 835 3490
Mineral Fuels
& Lubricants 2233 2084 2441 2983 3491 3888 4454 4311 12119 15691 13647 13107 14300 14954 14693 13830 37287 48194 71197
Crude Petroleum 604 1138 1617 1938 2406 2428 3089 3315 10751 14601 12468 10851 11293 8729 5949 7858 29389 35651 26753
Petroleum Products 1514 756 724 948 1249 929 1266 919 942 2062 2811 5793 8322 5726 7426 11640 44126
Other 115 106 100 97 116 67 102 170 237 194 196 432 422 246 472 903 318
Other Intermediate Goods 12747 13400 14564 15845 16709 19200 15461 13489 21613 26635 21173 7378 31242 42950 48248 36808 39817 52153 64445Oil & Fats 729 762 2092 2309 2508 2384 2173 4288 3781 3070 3586 5445 5044
Tissues & Textile Fibers 3002 2065 2539 3010 3207 4693 4637 7117 6457 4886 4076 5477 6707
Plastics 721 692 1340 1318 1308 2075 2020 2923 3604 2161 2975 2754 4339
Fertilizer 111 269 458 476 137 348 405 839 559 481 1892 1005 1366 810 3128 1959 3314
Paper & Pulp 820 742 1308 1718 1144 1730 1668 2096 2521 1774 1752 3583 2930
Cement 404 319 412 427 471 393 334 766 365 638 918 1342 1735 4244 2078 2811 2733
Iron & Steel Products 3693 3206 5748 6205 4175 6781 6626 9264 12503 9982 7208 12438 14565
Parts for Cars, etc. 971 761 958 1538 1096 1553 1530 2464 2407 1541 1927 248 4303
Animal Feed 71 61 32 42 40 43 37 69 52 16 18 51 54
Other 4845 4460 6257 9564 6817 7000 9741 12382 13822 11393 13069 17387 20456
Capital Goods 7535 8681 9885 11982 12920 17740 16202 11386 11483 15448 14882 19027 26901 42278 37131 45385 40556 39987 57303
Machinery 3508 3332 3860 5825 5534 7028 7012 4163 5183 8086 6808 8342 15717 14469 20869 26584 17716 17732 27184
Electrical Machinery 2508 2482 2326 2900 1920 2870 2865 2161 2210 2276 2507 3295 3595 4178 5589 7733 8114 5792 7793
Transport Equipment 775 1235 1535 1617 4438 6349 5211 4392 3260 3831 4584 5707 6076 21454 7998 8914 12933 12500 16202
Tools & Instruments 545 890 1102 663 822 625 980 1675 1505 2146 2625 2145 1779 3924 6106
Live Animals 3.1 5.2 21 7 11 5 4 10 8 31 23 9 14 39 18
Total Merchandise Imports 34931 35884 42024 46198 7320 59228 51755 5155 67257 8047 68434 5217 99632 35320 126077 134346 174840 184027 234743
Import Index 51.6 52.8 54.4 55.2 0.7 75.9 6.3 7.9 86.2 100 87.7 09.2 116.0 75.7 188.6 219.4 206.4 186.2 172.8
Total Imports in Constant
1975 ralas 67696 67962 78697 83692 7957 78034 8062 7988 78024 8047 78032 8038 85890 77018 66849 61233 84709 98933 135847
LEGEND: - indicates the value is negligible or zero.

































































































LEGEND: CPI = Consumer Price Index.
A blank indicates the information is not available.
EXHIBIT A-9
SOURCES OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
(billions of ralas)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Current Revenue 24.9 26.3 28.0 31.9 34.5 38.8 44.3 42.1 45.6 49.4 52.9 60.5 68.0 86.5 119.1 123.3 119.6 151.6 185.4 243.0
Tax Revenue 22.9 24.8 26.4 30.1 33.0 35.5 41.5 38. 40.7 44.5 48.9 50.2 62.8 76.8 109.1 102.6 102.8 117.3 139.4 160.7
Direct 3.8 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.6 6.6 6.9 6.5 9.3 8.2 9.3 7.4 10.5 12.5 25.7 21.2 24.9 24.1 26.5 37.4
Indirect 19.1 19.9 21.1 24.4 27.3 28.9 35.6 32.0 31.4 36.2 39.6 42.8 52.3 66.3 83.5 81.5 77.9 93.2 112.8 123.2
Consumption Taxes 2.8 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.9 5.8 5.6 6.1 6.4 6.6 7.9 8.2 9.9 9.8 28.1 31.5 39.9 54.3 51.1
Turnover Tax 2.1 2.2 2.7 3.1 7.0 6.8 7.7 7.2 7.4 8.9 10.2 10.2 12.5 14.0 18.6
Import Taxes 8.9 9.1 9.4 12.0 10.5 11.2 13.7 12.3 11.1 12.1 14.4 15.1 20.0 22.0 31.0 43.2 34.1 38.4 42.7 53.6
Export Taxes 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.9 3.1 5.5 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.7 8.3 10.0 12.0 13.0 15.4
Other Indirect 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.6 4.1 5.0 4.5 4.0 5.7 2.9 5.6 7.3 15.0 19.4 1.9 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.1
Non Tax Revenue 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.5 3.2 2.8 3.7 4.9 4.9 4.1 10.4 5.2 9.7 10.0 26.2 19.3 33.2 50.1 82.9
Marketing & Stabili-
zation Funds 15.6 26.4 36.3 61.8
Current Expenditures 24.3 24.5 26.5 28.9 32.4 30.8 33.8 37.5 44.3 45.2 49.4 63.3 78.0 90.7 107.0 113.6 115.7 131.6 145.8 172.7
Public Debt Service .8 .5 .6 1.1 1.5 1.3 2.1 2.1 4.7 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.9 4.9 2.3 4.0 6.8 10.9 14.9 25.4
Nages & Salaries 11.0 12.1 12.8 13.7 14.9 15.4 16.8 17.9 24.0 27.0 29.2 37.7 44.7 48.9 56.8 59.5 68.0 80.7 81.9 92.0
Goods & Services 3.8 3.3 4.0 4.3 4.7 10.9 11.3 10.9 9.1 9.1 10.9 16.3 22.0 25.5 13.2 32.8 23.6 22.0 26.2 28.4
Transfers & Subsidies 2.5 1.9 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.6 6.6 6.5 5.7 6.1 6.2 7.4 11.4 34.6 12.8 12.3 12.9 16.6 20.3
Other 6.2 6.6 6.5 6.8 8.2 ---- - - ' ---- - --- 4.5 5.0 5.1 6.2 4.6
Capital Expenditures 17.2 14.1 13.6 13.1 19.3 11.9 15.6 56.9 89.6 91.6 72.1 99.0 8.78
Other Expenditures .5 1.1 15.9 12.1 16.7 32.9 45.6 47.6 30.4 39.4 41.2 50.7
Marketing & Stabiliza-
tion Funds 8.2 7.5 14.6 19.5 33.6 30.3 6.1
Rice Imports 6.3 4.0 1.8 3.6 -- - 4.1 12.2 3.2 2.8
Other 1.4 0.6 0.3 9.8 12.0 -- 13.2 14.0 28.5 31.3
Total Expenditures 55.2 59.5 74.7 74.6 99.3 122.8 151.9 166.9 250.8 237.7 243.1 269.9 311.2
Expenditures as % GDP 20.1 21.0 21.5 19.6 25.6 29.5 31.2 28.1 36.3 30.1 24.4 22.1 22.6
Overall Balance 13.1 13.9 25.3 21.7 38.8 54.8 65.4 -47.8 -126.7 118.1 -87.0 81.6 -66.2
In Constant 1970 ralas
Current Revenue 39.4 38.2 33.6 34.4 35.8 37.1 44.2 54.6 49.2 38.1 36.9 37.8 41.5
Current Expenditures 35.1 37.1 30.8 32.2 37.5 42.5 46.3 49.1 45.3 36.9 32.0 29.7 29.5
Total Expenditures 51.7 49.8 50.9 48.6 58.8 67.0 77.5 76.5 100 75.7 59.2 55.0 53.2
LEGEND: -- indicates the value is negligible or zero.





In less than two weeks, President Peter Kamande is due to make his
annual "Report to the Nation on the Status of the Revolution" as part of the
1986 New Year's Day festival. The price of rice in the capital city of
Masunebi is now about 600 ralas per kilo; it has more than doubled since
June. In April, Kamande allowed the agricultural minister, at the
recommendation of the World Bank, to remove the ceiling price of 300 ralas,
an action which was the culmination of two years of successive
liberalizations of the rice sector. Unknown to the public, this decision
was also the source of open conflict among Kamande's ministers.
Rice has become the most important staple of the Ralandian diet; indeed,
Ralandians rank among the greatest consumers of rice per capita in the
world. 1 The average urban dweller consumes 400 grams of rice per day.
The Ralandian Workers Federation (RWF), the country's largest trade
union, as well as the National Union of Students and several of the largest
political parties openly opposed lifting the price ceiling on rice. As a
result of the increasing cost of consumer goods, especially rice, the RWF
has scheduled a rally on December 30th, to press its demand for an increase
in government wages of 25%. The wage of the average government worker,
50,000 ralas per month, has not increased in two years. President Kamande
knows that the public expects some statement from him regarding the
government's response to the current crisis in his New Year's speech.
In a report to the president, Joseph Rusisi, a key economic advisor set
out three policy options for dealing with this situation:
1. to maintain the current policy of gradual liberalization;
2. to increase the pace of liberalization to include other
sectors of the economy in the reforms;
IBefore the mid.-1970s maize was also a major staple. Pricing policy
has changed consumption habits during the past ten years.
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3. to backtrack on the liberalization action by reimposing
certain key controls and restoring the government's role,
through the parastatals which were formerly responsible
for the collection and distribution of rice at official
prices.
President Kamande ordered the Ministry of Rural Development and Agrarian
Reform (MRDAR) to commission two outside consultants to analyze the current
situation and to recommend actions. He specifically requested that these
consultants have differing perspectives on how to promote agricultural
development. The first consultant, Bird Associates from Washington, D.C.,
concluded that Ralandia should maintain its commitment to liberalization and
that the source of the current crisis was inconsistency in current
government policy. They argued that, despite short-term costs, Ralandia
would gain long-term benefits from speeding up the liberalization process.
The second consultant, the Center for Development Studies in England,
concluded that Ralandia should reimpose certain protections, most
importantly, the ceiling price for rice, arguing that monopolistic
speculative traders were hoarding rice in order to maximize profits and that
government should again become more actively involved in marketing. The
executive summaries of both of these reports are Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
Colonial Period
Prior to the British colonization, agriculture in Ralandia, as in most
of pre-colonial Africa, was dominated by small-holders. In order to
encourage European settlement, the crown seized 10% of the most fertile
land, and sold it to settlers at low prices. The colonial administration
made considerable public investments in building basic infrastructure to
support export-oriented agriculture, most notably transportation and
hydraulic systems. Through the imposition of a head tax, the colonial
administration generated revenues, ensured the availability of labor for the
settlers' plantations, and induced the indigenous population to produce a
surplus. The plantation sector was dominated by white settlers, while
small-holder agri cul ture remained the domain of indigenous farmers.
Private import/export companies developed strong links with the
settlers. Textile manufacturers and exporters, particularly the Indians and
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Chinese, developed networks to distribute inputs and collect products. The
colonial administration established marketing boards for rice, cassava,
coffee, pepper, vanilla, sugarcane, tropical fruits, cloves, and cotton.
They developed an integrated program to encourage exports. It included
establishing producer prices based on export market prices; supplying inputs
for export crops at subsidized prices; and developing research and extension
systems. As part of its policy of encouraging exports, the administration
set subsidized rates for truck and train transport of export commodities.
Export taxes were low enough not to discourage exports.
The colonial administration was interested in maintaining low domestic
consumer prices in order to avoid political discontent. At the same time
they sought to develop exports. These concerns determined their policies
affecting rice. Rice production, a predominantly small holder activity, was
encouraged by several specific policies: obliging each village to cultivate
rice; investing in hydraulic improvements; distributing subsidized
agricultural equipment; providing agricultural credit; and researching new
varieties. Rice prices were kept low by importing when local production was
insufficient, and fixing prices during crisis periods. After the
particularly disasterous floods of 1959, the colonial administration fixed
official prices for paddy and rice, with the intention of assuring producers
a fair remuneration, protecting consumers from speculative price
fluctuations, and safeguarding exports. This particular set of objectives
continued to guide rice marketing and price policy in the post-independence
period.
Private trading companies which often traded in several commodities had
a well-developed system for collecting agricultural products. The firm,
usually headquartered in Masunebi, would advance money to collectors located
in the rural areas. These collectors, operating under the license of the
firm, were responsible for grading and weighing, the products. For export
crops, the stabilization fund set the producer price. The firm paid the
collector a commission based on the quantity collected. For rice, the firm
paid the collector a negotiated price per kilo. He was free to pay whatever
he wanted in order to obtain the product. In some cases (especially in more
remote areas) a collector would commission a villager to collect on his
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behalf, paying a commission based on the quantity collected. Generally, the
trading companies had their own fleet of trucks as well as other necessary
equipment for bringing the products into the city. Their networks reached
far into the rural areas.
Independence
In accordance with its strategy of maintaining a close relationship with
the colonial power, the Nkisane government encouraged Europeans to maintain
their plantations. In addition, the government encouraged development of
indigenous agriculture by extending subsidized inputs to small-holders.
The institutional structure of agriculture remained basically the same
as under the colonial administration, with exports being promoted by a
combination of private companies and public marketing boards. Basically,
all the marketing boards and stabilization funds functioned similarly. The
Ministry of Commerce, with the Council of Ministers' approval,2 determined
the guaranteed producer prices payable for crops delivered to local buying
stations. In principle, this price was determined on the basis of the level
of existing crop inventories, crop forecasts, current and expected world
prices, and the level of financial reserves available to support the price.
In practice, the price paid to producers varied from one buying station to
another according to the cost of collection and other related intermediary
charges. It was determined as a function of the f.o.b. export price by
subtracting a certain amount for a tax plus the various marketing charges.
If the world price rose, the producer price would be raised moderately; if
it fell, the producer price would generally stay the same or drop slightly.
There was always a hefty tax paid to the government, though the exact
percentage varied with the world price.
During the period 1964-1970, the unit cost of producing rice decreased
and output grew rapidly. The adoption of irrigation, fertilizer, and
improved seeds expanded as a result of a massive rice development project in
2Prior to independence, the management committee of each stabilization
fund or marketing board set its own prices.
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the high plateau areas financed by the British government, the Rice
Transformation Scheme (RTS). This project, which was staffed largely by
expatriates, imported and delivered inputs and improved seeds to the farmers.
The system of setting official prices for rice, begun in 1959, appeared
to work reasonably effectively. Although the government did not intervene
directly in the market and did not rigourously apply price controls, most
transactions seemed to occur at prices close to the official ones.
In 1971 financing for the RTS ended, after which farmers had difficulty
obtaining inputs at the correct time. Consequently, they began to return to
their tried and true varieties. Rice output began to stagnate.
In the area of export crops, performance was mixed. Cotton, vanilla and
groundnut production took off. Cocoa, pepper, and tobacco output increased
steadily. Production of cloves, which follows a four year cycle, also
increased. Sugarcane, coffee and sisal production stagnated.
1973-1979
During the period of political turmoil from 1973 to 1976, agricultural
policy was largely neglected. Investments in physical infrastructure
(roads, irrigation canals, etc.) went into new projects at the expense of
maintaining existing facilities. Services also deteriorated as a result of
a series of poorly executed ministerial reorganizations. Rice output
continued to stagnate, and Ralandia began to import substantial quantities
of food, especially rice.
The new government's agricultural policy has been administered through
the Ministry of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (MRDAR). The MRDAR
was responsible for developing and executing production oriented policies
and for executing the pricing and marketing policies set out by the Ministry
of Commerce. Its jurisdiction covers providing support services for
agricultural, livestock, fishery and forestry production, including basic
farmer extension services, plant protection, veterinary services, irrigation
systems, and research. It is also responsible for agricultural planning,
land reform, and supervision of many parastatals and a number of
semi-autonomous agricultural agencies.
Feeling that it was too important to leave to the private sector, the
government established public control over the marketing of major
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commodities between 1973 and 1975. This was done by purchasing majority
interest in or nationalizing the major foreign-owned trading companies.
This was followed by efforts to establish an effective government monopoly,
the National Agricultural Products Agency (NAPA), for processing and
distribution of key commodities, most notably rice and cattle/meat.
Similarly, efforts were made to give state monopolies to the agro-industrial
enterprises which process a wide variety of agricultural commodities. First
they were nationalized and subsequently granted state monopolies.
Roadblocks were set up to prevent illegal inter-regional trade in
agricultural commodities, especially rice.
NAPA was created as an all encompassing organization oriented toward
production, processing, and distribution of agricultural products. It was
supposed to provide inputs, regulate prices, collect, buy, transport,
process and package, stock and sell agricultural products, especially paddy
and rice. In pursuit of this goal, NAPA established collection and
distribution centers for various products in each of the sub-locations.
NAPA agents were to go to central places to buy from the farmers at the
official producer prices.
Immediately after the revolution, many white settlers left Ralandia.
The Kamande government nationalized the plantations they left behind. These
lands were to be redistributed to socialist cooperatives. As part of the
"Race to 2000 Campaign", in June 1977 the government launched "Masarubu", a
program to establish decentralized collectives (a reorganization of local
government down to the village level). They were intended to be the focal
point for the improvement of agriculture, and for the management of state
collection and distribution agencies such as NAPA, RATCO, and TRACORIO3.
The government urged all citizens to invest in the rural areas. The newly
created National Bank for Agricultural Development established several
branches in rural areas. "Masarubu" also envisioned several projects which
were never implemented such as: sending 1000 agricultural engineers and
technicians from their offices in Masunebi to the countryside to advise and
3RATCO is the Ralandia Trading Company; and TRACORIO is the Trading
Company of Ralandia and the Indian Ocean.
31
work closely with the peasants; and requiring all high school graduates to
do national service in the countryside before continuing higher education or
seeking employment.
In 1978, in order to increase production and implement "Masarubu",
President Kamande, himself, toured the countryside. He offered villages
500,000 ralas to cultivate an additional 20 hectares of rice and form a
Masarubu village in which the land would be farmed collectively. Only six
Masarubu villages were ever formed.
Unable to lure the peasantry into collective farming, the government set
up the Development Brigade, a branch of the military which would be devoted
to development activities. The government made a massive investment in
agricultural equipment, 1000 tractors and 200 steam shovels, to supply these
soldiers with tools for modern production. After two years, much of the
equipment was in disrepair, and output from these state farms was virtually
zero. Eventually the government closed the farms and sold the equipment to
interested peasants and companies.
Prior to 1978, MRDAR was essentially organized along the functional
lines of agriculture, rural engineering, livestock, and water and forests.
In 1978 a far-reaching reorganization was introduced, which sought to
decentralize MRDAR staff and services along the lines of the "Masarubu"
reform. The purpose of the reorganization was to improve coordination among
the field services of the ministry, to shift the focus of management and
planning away from the capital to the district level and below, and to
promote close cooperation with the people. The reorganization was
undertaken with virtually no planning or preparation of staff and without
sufficient thought to the maintenance of technical discipline and authority
within the new decentralized structure. Consequently, services
deteriorated, making it difficult to implement new development efforts
through the Ministry's own organization. The Ministry was reorganized again
in December 1982, with the objective of returning to the pre-1978 functional
structure. Since then, MRDAR has had responsibility for establishing
producer prices. Exhibit B-3 shows the evolution of producer prices for the
major agricultural products.
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In the late 1970s the government created four parastatals to provide
inputs for agriculture: two companies which manufacture agricultural
implements, and two fertilizer factories which have not yet opened. Ten
other parastatals provide support services to agriculture, including the
export promotion activities which were formerly conducted by the
stabilization funds and a national agricultural research organization.
Financing the parastatals has been difficult. It is generally ad hoc,
without clear procedures. Many parastatals have had chronic deficits,
forcing them to borrow from state owned banks or receive government
subsidies to continue operating. Financial difficulties have led to poor
performance, which in turn increased losses. In the mid-1970s high world
prices for coffee, cocoa and sugar led to windfall export taxes which added
considerably to government revenues. The government did not plan for the
eventual fall in the prices of those commodities. Between 1976 and 1980
only six out of 33 parastatals under the supervision of MRDAR showed
profits, and 60% of their total profit in 1980 was from the cotton
production and marketing parastatal.
1980 - 1983
By 1980, production of paddy and the export crops of vanilla, pepper,
sugarcane and cocoa had been virtually stagnant for almost ten years.
Coffee output fell in 1976 and 1977 due to climatic factors and then
returned to its previous levels, stagnating between 1979 and 1984. Cloves
and cotton are the only products that sustained production increases through
the 1970s. Due to a fall in the price of exports, revenues from
agricultural exports did not increase substantially in the early 1980s. The
need for foreign exchange, however, was particularly high due to increased
imports of basic foodstuffs and to the drastically increased debt burden as
a result of the "Race to 2000 Campaign" program of the late 1970s.
Beginning in 1980, in the context of this balance of payments crisis,
the government was forced to decrease its purchase of imported inputs and
drastically reduce imports of consumer goods, exacerbating the already poor
performance of the agricultural sector, particularly rice. The black market
price of rice rose rapidly. As the difference between official and black
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market prices increased, less and less rice was available on the official
market. By 1981, the government recognized that there was an overall crisis
of the entire agricultural system. Something had to change.
In 1982, the Minister of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform, Simon
Kapana one of the new technocrats who replaced a politician as Minister,
requested the World Bank to fund a study of the rice sector in Ralandia.
One major conclusion of the study was that outside of the capital, consumers
used the parallel market extensively, and were paying higher than official
prices for rice. Based on the findings and recommendations of the study,
Kapana proposed a three phase liberalization of the rice sector: (1) to
legalize private trade between government established ceiling and floor
prices in all regions but the two reserve zones of AGPRODCO and RALAKO; (2)
to legalize private trade in the reserve zones; (3) to lift the price
ceiling on milled rice. In April 1983, Kapana announced to the Donor's
Consultative Group that the Ralandian government intended to fully
liberalize trade in locally grown rice, including removing all restrictions
on the trade, processing, and retailing of rice. The government intended to
continue to play an important role in influencing markets and prices
through control of imported rice.
In June 1983, the government announced the liberalization in the
Official Journal. Decree 1983.95 was announced on radio and television, and
an article appeared in the Ralandian Standard, which circulates mainly in
the capital city. On June 15, 1983 a special announcement was made in
Masunebi to private collectors so that they would begin to expand their
operations. Roadblocks, which had inhibited illegal traffic in
inter-regional rice trade, were removed.
Decree 1983.95 stipulated that the marketing of paddy and rice operates
under "the principle of free competition between the public and private
sectors". Rice marketing in the areas of AGPRODCO and RALAKCO, two large
parastal irrigation schemes which supplied more than 70% of the local paddy
sold by the government, was excluded from the liberalization. The decree
legalized the purchase of paddy by wholesalers who had been issued
collectors cards by the district authorities, and permitted the sale of
milled rice anywhere by any person wishing to do so. Only traders who deal
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in large quantities have been authorized to purchase paddy. Owners of small
mills and other small traders are still operating illegally. A separate
decree, 1983.96, fixed a floor price of 65 ralas/kg for paddy, a selling
price of 140 ralas/kg for imported rice and a ceiling price of 300 ralas/kg
for rice. (On June 14th, the day before, the official price for rice had
been 75 ralas/kg.) The floor price for paddy was raised to 75 ralas/kg in
July 1984, and to 85 ralas/kg in 1985.
1984-1985
Paddy production increased only slightly in 1984. However, the queues
in front of ration shops selling rice had disappeared. Rice was available
everywhere. Although the market price for rice was higher than the price of
imported rice, and the price of local rice rose slightly above the ceiling,
it was still lower than what black market prices had been, and regional
differences in prices had fallen. Exhibit B-4 shows official and parallel
market prices for rice.
In February 1985, the government announced that it would require
officially recognized traders to (1) declare their stocks of rice and paddy;
(2) hold security stocks which could be sold only with government approval;
and (3) justify their sale prices based on their costs.
All the government's shipments of imported rice for 1985 arrived by
June. Government rice shops received deliveries of imported rice regularly
between Janaury and August, after which no more deliveries were made. The
only rice available on the market between August and December was local rice
from the May/June harvest, which put considerable pressure on prices.
The ceiling price for rice was abandoned in June 1985.
Government's Goals In The Agricultural Sector
In a series of development strategy statements, speeches by top
officials including President Kamande and his agricultural ministers, and
national planning documents, the Ralandian government articulates its goals
for the agricultural sector. In rough order of their importance they are
the following:
1. To promote the full and effective control by Ralandians of the
economic resources of their country. The socialist revolution in Ralandia
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was directed at reassertion of national authority and autonomy as well as at
transformation toward socialism. Economic nationalism remains a constant
theme in the Kamande regime's policies. President Kamande's speeches are
infused with references to the struggle against neo-colonialism and the need
for self-reliance, especially in food.
2. To establish effective influence by the government over the
directions of development. The Kamande government equates market operations
with capitalism, and perceives operation of the market as limiting the
capacity of the government to direct development efforts. It has attempted
to control the development process by creating administrative institutions
and procedures. Since 1982, the government has been more flexible on this
issue. Kamande, himself, appointed a new group of economic technocrats to
ministerial posts who, while remaining wary of unfettered free markets,
believe that government should use market mechanisms to influence the
direction of economic outcomes.
3. To integrate the agricultural sector and agricultural resources into
the broader national development goals of the country. Agriculture is the
key to self-reliance. The agricultural sector must be integrated with
industry to provide raw materials for production, food for industrial
workers, and demand for the goods produced by the industrial sector.
4. To improve the productivity of the land and of the rural people.
The key to agricultural development lies in improving productivity. This
goal is the major operational focus for the Ministry of Rural Development
and Agrarian Reform.
5. To redistribute food from areas of surplus production to areas of
deficit production. Ralandia is marked by wide regional variations in food
production. One of the key goals of government is to ensure that deficit
areas, especially cities and towns, are supplied with food.
6. To provide relatively inexpensive food to consumers. The main
political demand of urban residents is for inexpensive food. The government
has always been committed to meeting this demand, through imports as well as
local produc tion. Thi s i s a par ti cul ar priori ty for the Mini stry of Supply.
7. To use agriculture in the guest for a viable balance of payments
situation. The government wants to promote participation in international
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trade and finance as an instrument for national development. Balance of
payments issues in agriculture have become increasingly important due to the
on-going balance of payments crisis. Promoting exports and minimizing the
need for imported food are seen as part of the solution. The Ministry of
Finance and the Central Bank have become more directly involved in
agricultural policy issues than before.
8. To use agriculture as a source for government revenues. This is
accomplished through a number of mechanisms including export taxes and
stabilization funds. While not often mentioned publicly, an examination of
the Ralandian budget shows. that the rural areas provide substantial
proportions of total government revenues.
EXHIBIT B-1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF BIRD ASSOCIATES REPORT
TO MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, RALANDIA
(Bird Associates is a Washington-based consulting firm which has been
active in promoting liberalization and privatization reforms in various
African countries. They previously participated in a World Bank long term
technical assistance team in Ralandia's Ministry of Rural Development and
Agrarian Reform. They are often hired by the World Bank.)
Mr. McKinnon, of Bird Associates, spent the first two weeks of December
1985 in Ralandia. A summary of his report follows:
A. Liberalization was the appropriate response to the agricultural
crisis of the early 1980s. The problems were that: (1)
liberalization was too narrowly conceived -- it should have included
sectors other than rice; (2) the government failed to sufficiently
publicize changes to either local officials or the public; 1 (3)
the price of imported rice was set too low; and (4) there was a lack
of complementary measures. To balance the anti-liberalization
pressures from consumers, the government should appeal for support
from those who would benefit from liberalization, rural producers
and merchants.
B. For the rice sector in particular, the government should improve the
physical infrastructure of the transportation system,2 and create
incentives for the private sector to move rice from producers to
1Our study indicated that: (1) many traders were not aware that their
rice trading activities are no longer illegal; and (2) that some local
officials still impose fines or jail private merchants when they find them
trading rice.
2Many regions which are surplus producers of rice, or which produce
export crops are frequently isolated by collapsed bridges or impassable
roads. Coffee producers in one region reported that down river shipment by
canoe is the only way they can evacuate their crop. One route along the
coast which took one day 30 years ago, now takes four days.
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consumers, ie. by liberalizing the licensing of truckers. The
government should sell imported rice at market prices to all but the
poorest consumers. Long term measures must include liberalization
of input supplies, intensified seed multiplication, and research.
Finally, in calculating imports the government should not consider
current levels of per capita consumption of rice as fixed.
C. For agriculture more broadly conceived, the government should (1)
further devalue the rala to shift the domestic terms of trade
between producers and consumers and to improve the viability of
exports; (2) reform the complex administrative system in the export
sector; (3) end fertilizer subsidies and allow the private sector to
distribute agricultural inputs to farmer; (4) allow market forces to
set prices for export crops, as it now does for rice; and (5) create
financial incentives and loosen administrative constraints to
promote foreign investment in agriculture which would result in
increased production and technological innovation.
EXHIBIT B-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES REPORT
TO MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, RALANDIA
(The Center for Development Studies (CDS) is Britain's major think-tank
on African development issues. Center staff have served as advisors to the
governments of Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Guinea, and have been
part of long term technical assistance staffs to export marketing boards.
CDS draws upon staff from Universities where many members of the
Revolutionary Government were trained.)
Mr. Vert from the CDS spent the final week of November and the first
week of December in Ralandia. The summary of his findings follows:
A. While the agricultural crisis of the early 1980s necessitated a new
approach on the part of government, the liberalization strategy that
was forced on the Ralandia government by the IMF and the World Bank
is the direct cause of high prices for rice. Continuing along the
liberalization road will further exacerbate current problems, and
lead to both economic immiseration of the workers and peasants and
threaten the ability of the government to maintain the socialist
orientation to which it is committed.
B. In terms of the rice sector, there are three main problems with the
liberalization scheme: (1) It made the government hostage to
exploitative intermediary groups, who are concerned only with
maximizing their wealth and not with the well-being of the people;
(2) it grossly overestimated the supply responsiveness of peasants
to changes in the price of paddy; and (3) it especially threatened
the livelihood of those Ralandians to whom the government has made
its greatest commitment, the poorer workers and farmers.
C. The liberalization strategy, if continued, will preclude the
Government of Ralandia from maintaining influence over the direction
of change in the rural areas. Instead, the government should
re-affirm its commitment as the vanguard of the socialist
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development process, acting on behalf of all the Ralandian people.
The ceiling price for rice should be reintroduced in order to
restore popular confidence in the regime and to meet the pressing
need of Ralandia's poor. Stiff penalties must be introduced for
economic sabotage, directed especially towards unscrupulous traders
who seek to use the current difficulties for their personal gain.
In order to promote production, the government must ensure that
low-cost inputs are made available to all farmers. Finally, in
order to stimulate diversification of exports, the government should
revitalize the research components of the major marketing boards and
stabilization funds.
EXHIBIT B-3
COMPARISON OF PRODUCER PRICES
(1972-1985)
PRODUCER PRICES
(nominal ralas/kg) 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Rice (paddy) 12.6 13.0 13.4 13.6 14.2 15.0 15 15 25 30 30 35 35 39 43 47 60 65 75 83
Coffee 100.0 105.0 105.0 105.0 133.0 133.0 133 133 162 162 162 177 180 185 215 250 260 280 330 395
Cloves 110 110 110 250 250 . 275 281 281 320 320 320 340 340 385 395 430 435 435 435 435
Vanilla 185 130 150 170 190 220 219 219 239 250 250 278 305 500 600 700 700 1000 1000 1000
Pepper 170 140 120 100 125 150 150 150 176 176 180 191 195 200 225 225 230 230 255 300
Sisal 40 36 30 35 34 34.4 31 59.6 74.3 70 80 80 74 84 86 140 150 150 -- --
Tobacco 177 148 92 87 102 94 121 119 126 140 140 160 160 174 191 210 231 231 256 --
Cotton 40 36 30 35 34 34.4 58 60 68 78 78 80 80 86 90 100 126 155 240 --
Groundnuts 214 179 111 105 123 114 26 27 33 38 38 42 45 45 55 65 80 80 - --
Cassava 2.75 3.0 3.0 3.25 3.25 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.0 6.0 6.0 6. 6.0
PRODUCER PRICE INDEX
(1972 - 100) 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Rice (paddy) 84 87 89 91 95 100 100 100 167 200 200 233 233 260 287 313 400 433 500 553
Coffee 75 79 79 79 100 100 100 100 122 122 122 133 135 139 162 188 195 211 248 297
Cloves 39 39 39 89 89 98 100 100 114 114 114 121 121 137 141 153 155 155 155 155
Vanilla 84 59 68 78 87 100 100 100 109 114 114 127 139 228 274 320 320 457 457 457
Pepper 113 93 80 67 83 100 100 100 117 117 120 127 130 133 150 150 153 153 170 200
Sisal 129 116 97 113 110 111 100 192 240 226 258 258 239 271 277 452 484 484
Tobacco 177 148 92 87 102 94 100 98 104 116 116 132 132 144 158 174 191 191 212 --
Cotton 79 100 100 103 117 134 134 138 138 148 155 172 217 267 414 --
Groundnuts 104 104 92 92 92 104 100 104 125 146 146 161 171 171 212 250 308 308 -
Cassava 81 88 88 96 96 100 100 100 118 176 176 176 176
LEGEND: -- indicates the value is negligible or zero.
A blank indicates the information is not available.
EXHIBIT B-4
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RALANDIA (C)
THE MACROECONOMY
On February 1, 1986, as British Airway's flight 234 leveled off for the
long flight across the Atlantic, Ralandia's Finance Minister, Justin
Sephamla, stared into the night, deep in thought. He had just completed
three days of meetings in Washington with officials from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Since being appointed Finance Minister by President
Kamande in 1981, Sephamla has been the key figure in negotiations between
his country and the IMF.
Sephamla is a well-respected figure in international financial circles.
A graduate of the London School of Business, he began his career in the
World Bank's Young Professional program before returning home to become
Research Director for the Central Bank of Ralandia. During his tenure at
the Finance Ministry, Ralandia has undertaken four consecutive agreements
with the IMF. Each agreement has run to its conclusion with the government
essentially meeting stabilization performance targets. Fund officials in
Washington credit this to the weight of Sephamla's voice in Ralandian
decision-making circles.
As Sephamla looked out the window, a wry smile came to his face as he
thought of his reputation as a 'responsible' financial manager. His recent
mission to Washington concerned initial discussions with IMF officials about
a fifth agreement between Ralandia and the Fund. Sephamla was contemplating
the report he would soon draft to the President outlining the gist of his
discussions with the IMF, the government's policy options, and his personal
assessment of those options. It was at moments like these that Sephamla
thought he should never have given up his career at the World Bank, for he
was deeply torn about what to advise President Kamande.
Sephamla was firmly convinced of the necessity for further financial
support from the IMF. When he came to office in 1981, Ralandia was in the
midst of a mushrooming balance of payments crisis. Sephamla had concluded
that generating a continued flow of external financial resources was the
necessary first step to restoring Ralandia's economic health. Earlier than
many, he realized the central gate-keeping role the IMF was likely to play
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in keeping external funds flowing. Unfortunately, as far as he could tell,
that situation remained.
He knew that participation in another IMF program was necessary if
Ralandia hoped to continue to expand its programs with the World Bank, the
International Development Association (IDA), and the Western donors, and to
again become a viable target for foreign investment. Moreover, as Sephamla
thought over the current balance of payments numbers, he realized that only
by continuing Ralandia's year-by-year debt reschedulings would a return to
solvency be possible. Another agreement with the Fund would greatly improve
Ralandia's fate at the Paris and London Clubs. 1  "No," Sephamla thought to
himself, "we simply can't get on without the Fund."
"But can we live with them?" During his meetings in Washington, it had
become depressingly clear that rather than rewarding Ralandian successes in
meeting stabilization. targets by easing off on the severity of
conditionality requirements, Fund officials believed that only by further
deepening stabilization measures could economic health be restored. To some
extent, Sephamla agreed. Within the Ralandian cabinet he had pushed hard
for a more rapid reform of the public administration and, especially, of the
money-draining state-owned enterprises. Fund officials, however, seemed
intent upon Ralandia's undertaking another large devaluation of at least 30%
in order to prime the pump of Ralandia's flagging export sector. Sephamla
could not understand this. Urban living standards had already been cut by a
combination of wage-restraint and prior devaluations. How much longer could
Ralandia avoid "IMF riots"?
More importantly, how could a further maxi-devaluation lead Ralandia
back to growth? If growth was not forthcoming soon, how much longer would
his colleagues, especially President Kamande, continue to take his advice on
the importance of financial prudence? "No", thought the Finance Minister,
"this time we can't knuckle under."
IThe Paris and London Clubs are associations of creditors. The Paris
Club deals with debt contracted from public agencies, and the London Club
with debt owed to commercial banks.
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While Justin Sephamla's plane sped across the Atlantic, Joseph Rusisi,
the President's Coordinator for Economics, was considering the next day's
meeting with his advisors in Masunebi to discuss guidelines for a new loan
program with the World Bank. In his prior position as Minister of
Agriculture, Rusisi was the architect of Ralandia's agricultural
liberalization efforts undertaken in cooperation with the World Bank. Like
Sephamla, Rusisi had been brought into the government by President Kamande
in 1981. His background includes a D.Phil. in economics from Cambridge, a
short stint with Unilever Corporation in Nairobi, and several years as Sonny
Ramphal's economic advisor in the Commonwealth Secretariat in London.
Rusisi is convinced that the time is ripe for expanding the government's
policy reform efforts. The best institutional mechanism for so doing would
be a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) Program supported by a substantial
credit from IDA, the low-interest loan window of the World Bank. Rusisi has
already negotiated a series of sector loans in agriculture, industry, and
transportation. He has been informed privately that Bank officials might
look favorably on a request for a more integrated program loan instrument.
In the meeting with his advisors, Rusisi wants to discuss the main
benefits and costs of entering into a SAL agreement with IDA. He believes
that a SAL would provide a major financial incentive for the government to
move forward on economic reform in a coordinated way. It would also provide
technical support from the Bank on how to do so, building on Bank
experiences both in other African countries and elsewhere -in the Third
World. The SAL arrangement, however, does have risks. It would involve
Bank officials much more directly in the policy process than had been the
case in the past. It would also commit the government to meeting a set of
policy reform 'targets' for continued disbursement of SAL funds.
Rusisi feels that the SAL's most significant danger might be to weaken
his own role. It would identify him more directly.with Bank technocrats who
had little direct experience in Ralandia and no real understanding of its
compl ex pol iti cal dynami cs . In order to mi nimi ze thi s pos si bil ity, Rusis i
wishes to develop a long initiating memo to be sent to the Bank by President
Kamande, outlining the set of issues and policies that a Ralandian SAL might
address. This might serve to keep the ini tiative in the SAL process in
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Ralandian hands. Rusisi himself has developed a memo that listed potential
structural adjustment issues (Exhibit C-1). In the meeting, he wants to
articulate the specific goals for each of these issues and develop proposals
for specific policies.
Anthony Mapumba, Ralandia's Minister for Trade and Industry, recently
returned from Lagos, Nigeria, where he attended the semi-annual meetings of
the African Development Bank's (ADB) ministerial commission on industrial
strategy. Mapumba is one of a small group of men who has been in every
cabinet since President Kamande took power in 1975. Indeed, his connections
with the President go back to the days of opposition to the Nkisane regime.
He was given leave of absence, shortly after the revolution, to take his
Masters in development studies from the Center for Development Studies in
England.
While in Lagos, Mapumba followed with great interest the Nigerian
government's deliberations about stabilization options, what to do about
their enormous foreign debt, and how to relate to the International Monetary
Fund. The Nigerian Minister of Industry, also on the ADB commission, shared
with Mapumba his views on tying the repayment of debt to revenues earned
from international trade. He favored limiting debt servicing payments to a
set percentage of export earnings in order not to starve industry of
absolutely necessary imported inputs. Mapumba was impressed by the way in
which the Nigerian leadership encouraged an open public debate on these
issues, and by the overwhelming response of the population in favor of a
locally-coordinated strategy of stabilization that avoided loss of
sovereignty to the IMF.
Since returning from Nigeria, Mapumba has thought over what lessons
there are in the Nigerian experience for Ralandia. While not overplaying
the similarities in the two countries' situations, Mapumba believes that it
is very important that President Kamande consider the possibility of
limiting the role of the international financial institutions in Ralandia's
economy. Mapumba knows one thing for sure: in the name of stabilization,
the IMF is strangling Ralandian state-owned industries by precluding the
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purchase of necessary inputs. He feels strongly that this must end.
Tomorrow he will meet with President Kamande to discuss this position.
President Peter Kamande re-read the letter he had just received from the
Secretary-General of the Organization for African Unity (OAU). As part of
the OAU's preparation for the forthcoming special session of the United
Nations General Assembly on Africa's Economic Crisis, the Secretary-General
has asked all African Heads-of-State to submit up-to-date details of their
governments' strategies for economic stabilization and recovery. The
Secretary-General stressed the point that the African caucus at the UN is
going to ask the industrialized nations for $50 - 100 billion in additional
assistance during the next five years. In order to make this request
credible, the OAU feels that it is imperative to be able to show that the
individual African countries are committed to active strategies for economic
rehabilitation. Given Ralandia's active participation in pan-African
affairs, President Kamande's outstanding reputation as a progressive African
leader and Ralandia's history of constructive relations with all of the
international institutions, the Secretary-General indicated that the details
of the Ralandian plan are of particular importance.
Kamande sat back in his chair and thought for a moment. He noted that
the Secretary-General's comments had avoided any mention of the importance
of Ralandia's actual economic performance. While the Central Bank's yearly
report is not yet completed, Kamande knows that the overall picture will be
no cause for celebration. Is this the result of all of the risks he has
taken, of not only reaching agreements with the IMF, but meeting targets?
Of initiating a liberalization program in agriculture that basically
dismantled the very institution on which he had put all of his hopes for
rural development? Of reestablishing closer ties to the British
government? "But," thought Kamande, "I guess that is the meaning of
underdevelopment."
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EVOLUTION OF RALANDIA'S MACROECONOMY
Independence-1976
After independence, the Nkisane government followed a cautious and
conservative macroeconomic policy. They sought to maintain a close balance
between imports and exports, between government revenues and expenditures
and coordinated monetary policy with the British Exchequer. Foreign
investment was encouraged as the main engine of investment through both tax
incentives and a liberal profit repatriation policy. In the 1960s, the
international environment was conducive for growth, providing both an
expanding market for exports and increasing volumes of direct foreign
investment. Ralandia performed relatively well in these circumstances,
achieving real growth in GDP of 2.3% per year during the 1960s. Given the
population growth of about 2% per year this allowed Ralandia to achieve
modest increase in per capita income.
In the final years of the Nkisane regime, the early 1970s, economic
performance began to deteriorate. Between Nkisane's fall and the
consolidation of power by Peter Kamande, a great uncertainty gripped the
nation and economic deterioration continued. This was further reinforced by
the oil shock of 1973-1974, which generated inflationary pressures into the
Ralandian economy and limited the capacity to import non-petroleum goods.
Ralandia's GDP essentially stagnated between 1973 and 1976. Industry was
particularly hard-hit, as foreign investors began to run down their assets
and ceased to expand their capacity due to the uncertainty of the political
and economic environment. Agricultural output grew less than 1% during
those years, while the country's population increased by about 10%.
Inflation during this period was 40%, a large increase over the previous
period. Most of the inflationary pressure was attributable to the effects
of increased oil prices.
Substantial policy changes were introduced in the years immediately
following the revolution. While Kamande continued to maintain a balance
between imports and exports, he created a series of administrative
mechanisms to give government much greater involvment in both sectors.
Indeed, administrative bottlenecks were one source of the major drop-off in
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imports during these years. Export earnings stagnated, largely due to the
recession in Europe.
The biggest policy changes introduced in this period concerned the role
of foreign capital and the role of the public sector. The government
dramatically narrowed the possiblities for profit repatriation by foreign
firms, and the Central Bank ceased its practice of converting profits of
foreign firms into foreign exchange. Concurrently, the role of the public
sector was transformed. Public spending rose dramatically as the new regime
(1) initiated a subsidy to consumers of rice; (2) increased spending on
social services; and (3) began the large-scale nationalization of industrial
and trading enterprises. In addition, the Ralandian government ceased
coordinating its monetary policy with Britain.
1977 - 1980
This period saw the initiation of the "Race to 2000 Campaign", the main
element of which was a massive investment program that had a dramatic impact
on Ralandia's macroeconomic framework. "Invest at all costs" was the
catch-phrase of the Campaign.
Ralandia's external economic relations changed dramatically under the
impact of this policy. During this period, imports grew by nearly 50%,
while exports increased by only 2.3%. This was financed by a combination of
a dramatic running down of the country's foreign exchange reserves from $69
million in 1977 to $5 million in 1979, and a massive increase in external
borrowing. Ralandia's external debt outstanding, public and private,
increased from $976 million in 1978 to $2.2 billion by 1981, a substantial
portion of which was at commercial rates. During these years, the
government lost control over the accumulation of debt as it devolved
authority for borrowing to individual ministries and parastatals. The debt
service ratio, which before 1977 was less than 5% of export earnings reached
over 50% by the early 1980s. Exhibits C-2 and C-3 show the evolution of the
balance of payments and the monetary situation.
In addition to rapidly expanding imports and foreign borrowing, the
"Race to 2000 Campaign" involved a major expansion of publi c investment and
spending. Government expenditures soared as a result of a massive program of
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investment in state-owned enterprises, expansion of schools and health care
facilities, and a large increase in the number of public employees.
Expansion of government revenues fell substantially behind the expansion in
expenditures. By 1980, expenditures were almost double the value of
revenues; the budget deficit had reached 18% of GDP.
In spite of the massive increase in imports, the huge rise in foreign
borrowing, and the government's public investment program, Ralandia achieved
only very modest levels of economic growth during this period: slightly
over 3% per annum. The bulk of this was in public administrative services
and industry. Agricultural production grew at less than 3% annually.
As a result of the "Race to 2000 Campaign", State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) became the key economic institutions outside the agricultural sector
and were given responsibility for distribution and processing of
agricultural output. The SOEs were either nationalized versions of former
private enterprises or had been created as part of the investment campaign.
In general, the SOEs were given official monopoly status and privileged
access to the nationalized banking system. In order to encourage
investment, bank lending rates were kept lower than the rate of inflation,
allowing the SOEs to borrow on very favorable terms, but discouraging
savings. Domestic credit increased by 41% annually during this period
through the expansion of the money supply. Given easy access to cheap
money, the autonomy to borrow abroad, plus monopoly status, the public
enterprises had little incentive to perform efficiently. By the early 1980s
only 10% of the domestic loans given to SOEs were being paid back on
schedule.
Between 1975 and 1978, the Ralandian Central Bank continued to operate
cautiously. But during the "Race to 2000 Campaign", the Bank rapidly
increased the money supply, both exacerbating domestic inflation and causing
the rala to be increasingly overvalued in relation to the major global
currencies. During this period, the official exchange rate for the rala
remained fixed against the pound. From 1978 to 1980 its overvaluation
increased by nearly 20% (Exhibit C-4).
Agriculture was relatively neglected during this period, and specific
policies discouraged production. The government's decision to subsidize
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rice to consumers led to low prices for paddy, in order to minimize the
margin between consumer and producer prices. At the same time, in order to
generate revenues, the government increased tax rates on exports. These
policies led producers to shift out of exports and to seek out the parallel
market to sell their surplus production. SOEs had been given responsibility
for purchasing and delivering inputs. A combination of financing and
organizational problems led to insufficient and badly timed input supplies.
1981 - 1985
By 1981, it was becoming evident to Ralandian officials that the results
of the "Race to 2000 Campaign" were very different from those its architects
had hoped for. With the drying-up of foreign commercial lending due to the
international recession and the end of the grace period for the loans begun
two years earlier, the government found itself facing a burgeoning balance
of payments crisis. Ralandia's foreign reserves were negligible, and export
receipts could not begin to meet both the needs of debt service and provide
foreign exchange to purchase imports. President Kamande appointed Justin
Sephamla as the new finance minister. Sephamla immediately began
negotiations with the IMF for Stand-By credits to meet the balance of
payments challenge.
Although Ralandia had participated in IMF programs in the 1970s, these
did not have a major impact. Targets were not met and the programs were not
completed. External credit on easier terms was available, and Ralandia's
external account never faced a severe problem. When Sephamla began
negotiating with the Fund in early 1981, the IMF proposed a wide range of
stabilization measures including realigning the exchange rate, slowing the
growth of domestic credit, diminishing the government deficit, decreasing
imports, increasing savings and slowing investment.
In 1981, Ralandia signed an agreement with the Fund initiating a series
of macroeconomic changes. The rala was no longer to be fixed to the pound
but was to be fixed against a basket of international currencies weighted by
their proportion of Ralandia's foreign trade. The agreement set sharp
restraints on the expansion of the money supply in order to reduce the rate
of inflation. It also set limits on government borrowing and committed the
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government to increase the interest rate in order to encourage domestic
savings and discourage uneconomic investment. Fund officials saw a major
source of Ralandia's difficulties as the low level of domestic savings in
the face of the high level of investment.
To diminish the budget deficit, the government agreed to curb its
spending by limiting the expansion of government employment, limiting wage
increases, and decreasing the subsidy for rice (increasing consumer
prices). Unwilling to actually cut back employment, they decreased spending
for non-salary items and cut back local as well as import expenditures for
many of the externally financed projects which they had begun in the
late 70s.
In the 1981 Agreement, the IMF made 100 million SDRs2 available to
Ralandia for balance of payments purposes. The Ralandian government
successfully met the targets in the Fund program, which was a major factor
in their ability to reschedule their debts with both the London and Paris
Clubs in 1982. These agreements essentially lowered Ralandia's debt service
ratio by extending the repayment period.
In 1983, after the completion of the first IMF agreement, Sephamla
immediately negotiated a second program. In the second agreement the IMF
focused attention on the exchange rate because the overvaluation of the rala
had worsened during the period of the first program; it also set targets for
diminishing rice imports and limiting borrowing by SOEs. In the context of
the second agreement, the Ralandian government initiated the first of what
was to be a series of devaluations of the rala. They continued the policies
of 1982 which limited government spending, controlled inflation, and
decreased imports. In addition, liberalization of the rice sector, which
included ending the subsidy for rice (even imports), gave further relief to
the budget and was the first step toward encouraging private sector
involvement in the economy.
2SDRs, Special Drawing Rights, are an international money, created by
the IMF, which can be used to settle international debts between monetary
authorities. The value of an SDR is fixed against a bundle of currencies.
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The government's response to the economic crisis extended beyond seeking
help from the IMF. President Kamande believed that the recent crisis was
caused at least in part by a lack of coordination within government. To
improve this situation, in 1984 he created the position of advisor on
economic coordination, to which he appointed Joseph Rusisi. One of Rusisi's
first recommendations was to create a committee within the Council of
Ministers which would be responsible for coordinating government decisions
about investment in all sectors.
By the end of 1984, Ralandia had successfully completed three IMF
Stand-By Agreements, which had had a significant impact. Inflation was
successfully under control, the series of nominal devaluations had led to a
real devaluation of 20%, and returned the real effective exchange rate to
its 1977 level. The budget deficit was reduced to a quarter of budget
revenues, under 5% of GDP. The current account balance,3 while still a
problem, was no longer in the precarious position of several years earlier.
Output in the economy, however, was stagnating; in 1984, real per capita GDP
was only 91% of its 1980 level.
Recognizing the need to revitalize the industrial sector, without
jeapordizing the macroeconomy, the Minister for Trade and Industry undertook
negotiations with the World Bank for an industrial sector loan. The program
he proposed to the Bank included progressive liberalization of prices in
certain industries and a reform of administrative procedures for raising
prices of goods produced by State-Owned Enterprises. Whereas formerly, the
Ministry might take up to eight months to reply to a request to raise
prices, now it was required to respond within 30 days, or the enterprise
could raise its price without authorization. In early 1985, prices were
liberalized for products making up about 35% of industrial value added. In
late 1985, the list was expanded to include an additional 25% of industrial
value added.
3Exports, imports and financial transfers from abroad are included in
calculation of the current account balance.
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Despite the devaluations, export earnings have not grown significantly,
and Ralandia has not added any products to its list of exports in many
years. Several ministers feel that the current administrative controls and
remaining export monopolies for SOEs are a severe constraint to increasing
exports. Rusisi has received several complaints from businessmen that their
attempts to export small volumes of new products, both agricultural and
non-agricultural, were thwarted by the long delays involved in getting
export licenses. During cabinet discussions, Rusisi has pointed out that
the current regulation limiting retention of foreign exchange by exporters
to 5% of earnings (the rest must be converted to ralas at the official
exchange rate) gives little incentive to potential exporters. Proposals for
reforming the administrative system of authorizing exports have been
discussed during several recent cabinet meetings.
The government currently does not allow foreign exchange to be traded
freely. Foreign exchange earnings must be deposited with the Central Bank,
which has a "foreign exchange allocation committee" responsible for
distribution. Ministries, State-Owned Enterprises, businesses and
individuals must apply for foreign exchange through the committee and
purchase it at the official rate in exchange for ralas. Allocation of
foreign exchange is based on the previous year's distribution, marginally
adjusted.
Among the biggest disappointments of the "Race to 2000 Campaign" was the
performance of the 170 State-Owned Enterprises. In response, the government
has begun to promote domestic private enterprise and to try to attract
foreign investment. As part of this effort, SOEs have lost their privileged
access to loans and to foreign exchange. In addition, the government is
allowing private enterprises to compete with the SOEs in several sectors.
However, the development of the private sector is severely hampered by the
credit crunch of the stabilization program.
The government has begun a case-by-case effort to improve the efficiency
of the SOEs. To date, five have been restructured. The greatest success
has been Air Ralandia: In less than two years, it was transformed from a
net drain on the government budget to a profit-earning organization by
divesting itself of non-air services, pruning loss-making routes,
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rehabilitating infrastructure and equipment, raising fares, and enforcing
payment by government organizations.
In 1985, a liberal foreign investment code was announced, allowing
repatriation of profits and providing tax incentives. At the same time,
Ralandia signed an agreement with the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation of the United States which was designed to encourage American





FROM: Joseph Rusisi, Economic Coordinator
DATE: January 20, 1986
SUBJ: Issues to be Considered in Discussing a Structural Adjustment
Program with the World Bank
The following is a list of topics to be considered for inclusion in an
initiating memo from President Kamande to the International Development
Association, Washington, proposing a Structural Adjustment Loan. We need to
generate specific goals and policies relating to these issues and to others
you may wish to add to this list.
A. export promotion
B. foreign exchange allocation
C. reform of State-Owned Enterprises







BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUMMARY
(US $ million)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Exports, goods, NFS 202.6 223.7 237.2 293.1 366.7 329.3 413.3 439.6 495.5 523.9 391.6 378.6 363.5 388.7
Merchandise exports, FOB 147.4 166.1 200.3 247.4 319.3 288.7 366.6 405.1 413.7 436.3 323.5 329.1 318.5 333.3
Imports, goods, NFS -248.7 -241.0 -275.4 -360.5 -471.1 -404.2 -463.5 -553.1 -928.9 -1074.8 -734.6 -651.7 -580.3 -502.5
Merchandise imports, FOB -177.5 -168.3 -177.6 -238.7 -331.5 -261.5 -325.7 -386.5 -662.4 -764.3 -510.8 -451.5 -399.7 -352.1
Trade Balance
(Exports FOB & Imports FOB) -30.1 -2.2 22.7 8.7 -12.2 27.2 40.9 18.6 -248.7 -328.0 -187.3 -122.4 -81.2 -18.8
Net factor service income from abroad -36.1 -35.9 -31.0 -28.8 -44.9 -40.9 -16.3 -33.8 -56.8 -44.0 -88.3 -94.6 -106.3 -141.8
Private unequited transfers -- -- -- 7.5 -- 3.3 -- 8.0 7.1 . 3.8 4.0 -1.4 -1.2 3.5
Current Balance -27.1 34.7 -10.7 -64.4 -70.4 -76.6 -22.2 -113.9 -441.9 -591.1 -427.3 -369.1 -334.3 -252.1
Net Capital and Monetary Transfers 31.1 -28.2 22.6 40.8 46.1 26.6 55.8 68.8 385.0 548.5 364.7 296.8 260.5 --
External Public Debt
Debt Outstanding (including
undisbursed) 150.0 157.2 208.5 239.7 378.9 427.1 546.7 976.1 1612.2 2156.2 1735.5 -- - -
Disbursements 110.1 94.5 120.9 140.5 234.1 260.7 330.6 428.9 819.1 1352.4 1322.1 1532.0 1732.6 1853.4
Principal repayments 6.2 6.3 9.3 6.8 8.2 8.5 8.0 -11.8 -18.0 -33.8 -76.3 -110.4 -183.9 175.4
Interest repayments 2.7 2.4 3.6 3.5 4.2 4.5 4.9 7.3 -16.4 -25.9 -42.9 -- - -
Debt Relief - - - - - - - - - -- -75.9 -89.5 -34.8 -222.6
Annual Financing
Net from IMF 1 -- -- 3.7 2.1 -- -- -3.1 -0.9 44.0 38.6 57.2 6.9 18.3
Banks - -- -- -- - -- -- -- 6.1 6.6 -21.3 -26.3 -0.3 -11.4
Arrears, consolidated arrears - - -- -- -- -- -- -- - 296.3 25.8 2.9 74.4 -9.2
SDR allocations - 3.0 -- -- - -- - -- 4.7 4.7 4.0 - - -
Trust fund -- - -- -- -- -- -- 13.3 - 20.4 - - - --
Other - - -- -19.5 -- -4.6 -- -10.2 -45.2 -72.9 3.6 82.6 -44.5 43.8
LEGEND: - indicates the value is negligible or zero.






1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Domestic Credit 50.6-62.3 61.6 82.8 90.8 101.6 124.4 142.3 208.2 340.1 413.2 483.9 458.1 640.2
Net Credit to Government 181.1 240.8 268.5 306.6 340.0
Credit, Private 159.0 172.4 215.4 241.5 300.2
Broad Money (M2) 47.0 68.2 71.5 85.3 87.0 100.0 121.6 136.3 174.0 206.0 249.8 275.4 271.4 321.1
External Position (net) 3.5 10.1 10.9 12.9 12.3 12.2 18.7 -0.6 45.1 125.2 158.6 255.4 405.6 562.1
Short-term Foreign Liabilities -1.3 5.4 6.5 8.9 8.9 9.4 16.4 -3.4 15.9 93.4 49.8 110.9 121.4 174.4
Long-term Foreign Liabilities 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.4 2.8 2.3 2.8 29.2 31.8 108.8 144.5 282.8 387.7
Rescheduled Agreements ----------- -- -- -- -- 49.9 87.5 193.1 301.4
Other Liabilities (net) -0.2 5.6 3.4 5.9 7.0 4 .2 -0.1 15.6 18.1 8.9 4.8 -46.9 127.5 244.9
Devaluation Adjustment-- - ------------- -- -- -- -- -55.1 108.6 200.7
International Reserves 52.2 67.9 49.4 35.6 42.2 68.9 59.2 5.0 9.1 26.5 20.0 29.2 58.9
SDR's 9.5 10.5 0.2 1.1 2.2 8.3 11.3 -- -- 0.3 1.3 0.1 1.5
Reserve Position in IMF 5.5 6.1--- - - - - -- -- -- 0.4 1.3 - -
Gold & Foreign Exchange 37.3 51.3 49.2 34.5 40.0 60.6 47.9 5.0 9.1 25.8 17.4 29.1 57.4
IMF Position
Quota 28.2 31.4 31.8 30.4 30.2 31.6 44.3 43.9 66.4 60.1 56.3 71.0 68.1
Drawing Outstanding -- -- 10.4 22.6 22..5 25.1 23.5 14.0 32.9 29.9 28.0 26.7 23.4
Oil Facility Drawings -- -- 4.2 16.7 16.6 7.6 7.2 5.7 13.4 52.9 83.4 91.6 106.5
Use of Fund Credit -- -- 4.2 16.7 16.6 19.0 17.5 12.8 55.9 88.2 139.7 142.3 154.8
LEGEND: -- indicates the value is negligible or zero.
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This coming fall (fall, 1986), CRED will publish the final version of
the following set of case studies as the first in the new CRED Case Studies
Series. This set will be published in both English and French, and will be
available in early September for classroom use, at a cost of approximately
$4.25, postpaid. Please note: This work is copyrighted; no part of it may
be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including
photocopying.
If you would be interested in using the "Ralandia Case Studies" for
classroom discussion in a fall 1986 or spring 1987 course, please return a
copy of this page to
Ms. Anne Bagnoli, Publications Coordinator
Center For Research on Economic Development
Lorch Hall
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
Returning the form below will enable you to receive an order form with the
final price, when the final version is ready.
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